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Abstract
The present study examined whether evidence timing and witness motivation 
effect mock jurors’ decisions.  Participants read a mock case where the 
defendant’s alibi was; not corroborated, corroborated by a motivated alibi 
witness (with prior relationship with the defendant), or corroborated by an 
unmotivated alibi witness (with no relationship with the defendant).  Where 
present, the alibi corroboration was provided either at a timely point in the police 
investigation, or delayed to ‘ambush’ the court.  Supporting prior literature, 
timely alibis were seen as significantly more reliable when substantiated by an 
unmotivated alibi witness than by a motivated witness.  Additionally, when the 
alibi witness was unmotivated, timely evidence was perceived as significantly 
more reliable than ambush evidence.  However, alibi corroborator and timing did 
not have a significant effect on either case verdicts or perceptions of defendant 
reliability.  The findings suggest that defendants may not be unfairly advantaged 
if their ambush alibi is admitted into court. 
Keywords: alibi witness evidence; alibi timing; alibi witness motivation; 
juror decision-making; credibility; deception; juror decision-making; mock juries; 
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Alibi timing and alibi witness motivation
Considerable research has focused upon prosecution eyewitnesses (see 
for example Bradfield Douglass, Neuschatz, Imrich, & Wilkinson, 2010) whereas 
research and understanding of alibi evaluations remains limited (Sommers & 
Douglass, 2007).  It has been demonstrated in real cases in America that alibi 
corroboration from friends, family, and/or acquaintances does not always 
prevent false convictions (The Innocence Project, 2010), possibly because alibi 
evidence is perceived as being less reliable than other forms of trial evidence, 
such as DNA and eyewitness testimony (Olson & Wells, 2004).  In fact, alibis 
appear be viewed negatively as a default (Allison, Jung, Sweeney, & Culhane, 
2014) with the high level of suspicion directed towards alibi evidence dubbed 
the alibi scepticism hypothesis (Olson & Wells, 2004).  In addition, people 
perform at worse than chance levels when discriminating between true and 
false alibi statements (Culhane, et al., 2013).  It is therefore likely that juror 
biases and poor detection of deceptive alibis are hindering the administration of 
justice (Wells et al., 1998).  Further research is required if this type of evidence 
is to be better understood and evaluated more accurately in court.
Motivation 
The alibi literature has drawn a distinction between motivated alibi 
witnesses (with an existing relationship with the defendant) and unmotivated 
alibi witnesses (with no relationship with the defendant prior to the case), based 
upon the alibi witness’s perceived motivation to lie for the defendant.  Culhane, 
Hosch, and Kehn (2008) found that a majority of participants believed someone, 
mostly a friend, parent or romantic partner, would lie on their behalf if required. 
More recently, Culhane et al. (2013) discovered that alibis provided by student 
participants were most commonly corroborated by family, friends and familiar 
others, with strangers and colleagues rarely providing a supporting statement. 
Furthermore, Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez, & Shaw (2011) found that 
participants were most willing to lie for their biological relations (sister and 
cousin), followed by those related by marriage (sister-in-law and cousin-in-law) 
and were least likely to lie for individuals with only a social connection (co-
worker and stranger seen regularly in a shop).  Similarly, a significant 
association between unmotivated alibi witnesses and revealing a defendant’s 
offending behaviour has also been found when utilising a more ecologically 
valid mock-police interview paradigm (Fawcett, 2012) rather than 
questionnaires (Culhane, et al., 2008; Hosch et al., 2011).  In general, the 
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evidence suggests a greater likelihood of deception by motivated compared to 
unmotivated alibi witnesses.  
Prior research has posited that motivated alibi witness deception stems 
from increased likelihood of reciprocal altruism amongst known individuals 
(Hosch et al., 2011).  Hosch et al. suggest that Hamiliton’s (1964) kin selection 
theory could explain why individuals are more willing to provide a false alibi for 
those to whom they are genetically related; the altruistic false alibi enhances the 
chance of shared genes being based to future generations.  Greater alibi 
scepticism towards defendants with motivated alibi witnesses compared to 
those with an unmotivated alibi witness or no alibi witness at all (Burke & Turtle, 
2004; Culhane, 2005; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, 
Djadali, & Sanchez, 2000) could also be explained by evaluator decision-
making being driven by a belief in kin selection theory and/or reciprocal 
altruism.  
As individuals spend the majority of their time with family members and 
friends it is only logical that these relations are the most common individuals 
cited to corroborate genuine alibis both experimental research (Culhane et al., 
2013) and real life settings.  However, Olson and Wells (2004) discovered that 
participants overestimated the ease with which alibi providers can produce 
strong evidence to support their alibi, suggesting that alibi scepticism stems 
from the misperception that genuine alibis are easy to strongly corroborate.  On 
a positive note, once they realised the difficultly of constructing their own alibi, 
participants subsequently viewed others' alibis more leniently.  This implies that 
there may be a simple solution to counteract alibi scepticism; getting jurors to 
experience for themselves the difficulty of alibi generation and corroboration. 
However, more recently Strange, Dysart, and Loftus (2014) found that 
generation of their own alibi did not make people more trusting towards alibi 
witnesses.  
Another aspect of alibi scepticism is the belief that unmotivated strangers 
are more likely to provide accurate alibis as they have no clear motive to lie. 
However, Marion and Burke (2013) found that 23% of participants lied to protect 
a previously unknown individual accused of a mock theft, showing that relative 
strangers cannot always be relied upon to be honest.  Furthermore, individuals 
do not appear to consider the possibility of unmotivated stranger alibi witnesses 
being unreliable due to mistaken identification of the defendant (Olson & Wells, 
2004).  Therefore, just as people have an inaccurate understanding of the 
factors that influence prosecution eyewitness accuracy (Neal, Christiansen, 
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Bornstein, & Robicheaux, 2012) it appears they are also unaware of the factors 
which could affect alibi witness accuracy.  Despite some evidence that 
motivation of child alibi witnesses does not influence perceptions of defendant 
guilt (Price & Dahl, 2012), there is almost blanket scepticism of motivated adult 
alibi witnesses (Olson & Wells, 2004).  However, the evidence presented here 
suggests that this scepticism may be misplaced. This highlights the need for 
further academic attention on this issue, given the limited existing research.  
Alibi timing
In accordance with section 6A(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations 
Act (1996) in England and Wales the defence must give details of their defence 
statement if an alibi is involved.  This allows thorough police investigation to 
exonerate innocent suspects with robust alibis prior to trial (Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales, 2008), therefore saving the time and money associated 
with a lengthy court case (Epstein, 1964).  The very fact that the defendant is in 
court despite having an alibi may imply to jurors that the alibi is unreliable or 
false.  It is, therefore, no surprise that mock detectives consider alibis to be 
stronger than do mock jurors (Sommers & Douglass, 2007).  In relation to this 
Gooderson (1977) points out that the term alibi is heavily loaded and rather than 
being another piece of trial evidence, an alibi is viewed as a point for the 
defence to prove.  In fact, alibis are only considered by jurors when there is a 
lack of other strong evidence in the case and prevent police scrutiny of their 
alibi veracity (Shpurik & Meissner, 2004).  It may, therefore, be in the interests 
of defendants with a weak or false alibi to withhold this from the prosecution 
team until trial in order to ambush the case.  Kerans (1982) states that "without 
notice of it [the alibi], the Crown is surprised and cannot rebut without an 
adjournment to investigate" (p. 47).  Thus, there is a clear incentive for guilty 
defendants or those with little or no corroborating evidence to provide an 
ambush (deliberately delayed) alibi.  
Through ruling as inadmissible any evidence that has not been disclosed prior 
to trial, judges have the ability to prevent alibis ambushing cases (R v Chorley 
Justices 2006).  However, Epstein (1964) found that 52% of American 
prosecutors surveyed stated that alibi evidence not disclosed at an early stage 
was never or seldom excluded from court.  More recently, an analysis of 
Canadian cases demonstrated that ambush alibis were a common tactic despite 
most Canadian jurisdictions having an early disclosure requirement similar to 
that in England and Wales (Criminal Justice Act, 2003; Criminal Procedure and 
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Investigations Act, 1996; Turtle & Burke, 2003).  In fact, the Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales (2008) stated that he could not think of a single instance 
where a lack of disclosure prevented an alibi defence being heard in court, such 
was the rarity of this ruling being followed.  This apparent international disregard 
of legislation and case law may be due to the overriding objective of the criminal 
procedure rules for criminal cases to be dealt with 'justly.’  A judge's refusal to 
admit potentially exonerating evidence into court solely due to its late disclosure 
may not be considered just.  The potential therefore exists for ambush alibis to 
weaken the prosecution team's case and ultimately allow guilty defendants to 
be acquitted.
However, several American studies demonstrate that ambush alibis may not 
provide defendants with an unfair advantage in court.  Utilising a mock juror 
research paradigm Berman and Cutler (1996) revealed that convictions were 
less likely in the presence of any inconsistent prosecution eyewitness testimony. 
Furthermore, witnesses whose statements in court are inconsistent with their 
previous statements are perceived as being significantly less accurate than 
witnesses who exaggerate, are inconsistent with other witnesses or recall items 
not previously recalled (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999). 
Similarly, American police officers’ responses to questionnaires demonstrate 
that changes to alibis are generally thought to be indicative of deception, rather 
than memory failures (Dysart & Strange, 2012), and these changes are 
evaluated more negatively than alibis than are maintained (Culhane & Hosch, 
2012).  This may be due to evidence inconsistency being a popular, although 
inaccurate, cue to deception (Vrij, 2008).  Confidence is greater amongst alibi 
witnesses with consistent stories (Strange et al., 2014) implying that jurors’ over 
reliance on consistency as a cue to honesty (evidence here) may also account 
for scepticism of inconsistent evidence in real cases.  However, examination of 
this suggestion is prevented by the lack of video stimuli in much of the relevant 
alibi research.  This all implies that ambush alibis may be viewed as 
synonymous with deception and rather than provide defendants with an 
advantage in court, may actually benefit the prosecution (Culhane, et al., 2013). 
Although they may arise out of a deliberate attempt to ambush the court, 
genuine honest alibis that ambush the court can also occur.  Despite a 
widespread perception that memory is accurate (Valentine, 2008), copious 
research illustrates that memory is reconstructed from incompletely encoded 
information and influenced by schematic expectations (for example see 
Osborne & Davies, 2014).  Ridley (2013) and Brewer (1988) assert that greater 
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attention at the time of experiencing and encoding means that significant events 
may be recalled more accurately.  Although they are good at recalling which day 
of the week a memorable event occurred, American college students frequently 
cite the wrong week when asked for an alibi for a given time (Skowronski, Betz, 
Thompson, & Shannon 1991).  Similarly, when alibis are requested many 
participants state where they usually are at the specified time, rather than where 
they actually were if this deviates from their usual schema (Kurbat, Shevell, & 
Rips, 1998; Leins & Charman, 2013).  Due to the necessity of consulting 
calendars and diaries to discover one’s own whereabouts, Kurbat et al. (1998) 
termed this trend the calendar effect.  These findings imply that innocent 
suspects (for whom the time of the crime lacks significance until they become a 
suspect) may be more susceptible to changing their alibi due to a reliance on 
schemas and a lack of salience to their actions at the time of the crime.  In fact, 
Olson and Charman (2011) found that mistakes forced 36% of innocent mock 
suspects to change their alibi just 48 hours after providing it, and Strange at al. 
(2014) found that fewer than 50% of participants providing honest alibi stories 
were consistent following a one-week delay.  To consider all ambush alibis as 
indicative of guilt is therefore inappropriate, as theoretically ambush alibis will 
be more common amongst innocent defendants (Strange et al., 2014). 
However, Culhane et al. (2013) found that, following a two day delay, 11.9% of 
participants changed their deliberately false alibi story, compared to fewer than 
4% of participants changing their truthful alibi suggesting that changes to alibis 
may actually be more commonly associated with deception than honesty.  
Dahl, Brimacombe, and Lindsay (2009) investigated the effect of alibi 
evidence and eyewitness evidence timing within the police investigation setting. 
Although examining the stage at which police interviewed the witnesses rather 
than ambush strategies per se, their findings indicated that investigators are not 
influenced more by eyewitness evidence than alibi witness evidence.  Instead, a 
strong alibi (colleague with corroborating receipts) was found to have an effect 
on decision-making if it was received after eyewitness evidence.  It was only 
when the alibi presented was weak (best friend with no physical corroborating 
evidence), and an eyewitness had positively identified the suspect, that alibi 
evidence failed to influence mock-police evaluations of suspect guilt.  These 
findings clearly indicate the importance of timing and corroboration upon 
evaluation of eyewitnesses and alibi witnesses within the low alibi-suspicion 
investigation setting (Sommers & Douglass, 2007).  In addition, researchers 
have suggested that further research regarding alibi timing (alibi disclosed 
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during initial investigations opposed to alibi disclosure during the trial) is 
required (Mathews & Allison, 2010).  It is therefore important that these 
variables are assessed within the courtroom setting where general suspicion of 
alibis is greater (Sommers & Douglass, 2007).  
Although changes to alibis (Culhane et al., 2008; Culhane & Hosch, 2012; 
Culhane et al., 2013), and the effect of alibi timing within cases, have been 
assessed previously (Price & Dahl, 2014), the current research is the only study 
to date examining whether ambush alibis influence juror decision-making.  The 
past relevant literature is unclear as to whether ambush alibis will be taken as 
an indicator of inconsistency and deception, or unfairly benefit deceptive 
defendants through prevention of police investigation of alibi veracity.  Thus, 
there is a need for empirical research regarding the effect of alibi disclosure 
timing upon juror decision making.
Summary
Research illustrates that mock jurors assess the testimony of motivated and 
unmotivated alibi witnesses differently.  There is, however, no research 
pertaining to evaluations of alibi witnesses and defendants in cases involving 
ambush alibis, despite the evidence that ambush alibis may occur frequently. 
The study reported here therefore examines the influence of timely and ambush 
alibi evidence from motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses upon juror 
decision-making.  In accordance with the theories of kin selection, reciprocal 
altruism and lay perception that memory consistency is a cue to accuracy, it 
was hypothesised that motivated alibi witnesses and ambush alibis would be 
associated with more guilty verdicts than unmotivated alibi witnesses and timely 
alibis.  Additionally, it was anticipated that assessments of defendant reliability 
and alibi witness reliability would be lower with ambush alibis and motivated 
witnesses, than with unmotivated alibi witnesses and timely alibi evidence.  
Method
Design
The study implemented a 2 x 2 between participants experimental design.  Alibi 
witness motivation (motivated, unmotivated) and alibi timing (timely, ambush) 
were manipulated systematically in an assault case to create four experimental 
conditions.  A timely alibi occurred when defendants revealed their alibi within a 
police interview, whereas an ambush alibi was only revealed in court.  The 
motivated witness was the defendant’s girlfriend, and the unmotivated alibi 
Running head: ALIBI TIMING AND ALIBI WITNESS MOTIVATION
witness was the defendant’s neighbour.  A fifth control condition contained no 
alibi witness evidence.  Juror verdicts (guilty, not guilty), verdict confidence, and 
the perceived reliability of the defendant and the alibi witness formed the 
dependant variables.  
Participants 
Participants were an opportunity sample of psychology students at university in 
the North of England, as well as individuals from the community recruited 
through a snowballing technique on an online social media site.  The study was 
hosted online and consisted of a series of linked webpages containing case 
information and evidence questionnaires.  A total of 180 participants were 
evenly distributed between the five conditions took part in the research. 
Participants all met the criteria for jury duty in England and Wales specified by 
the Juries Act (1974); they were aged between 18 and 70 years, were resident 
in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man for a minimum of 
five years since reaching 13 years of age, were on the electoral register, had 
not served a prison or youth custody sentence within the previous ten years (or 
of over five years duration at any time), and had no current or previous mental 
health condition or mental illness.  The sample was predominantly female with 
48 males compared to 131 females (one participant did not record their sex). 
The mean age of participants was 21.15 years (SD = 9.69), with participants 
ranging from 18 to 63 years of age.  The majority of participants were students 
(74.4%).  
Materials 
The study materials were delivered sequentially in a series of linked webpages 
with a separate URL associated with each condition.  The first page outlined the 
study procedure, requirements, data use and gained informed consent from 
participants.  The subsequent webpages contained the case indictment, trial 
summary, and questions about the participants’ perceptions of the case.  
The case was constructed so that there was sufficient evidence so that the 
defendant could stand trial, but not so much evidence that his alibi (where 
presented) would not be plausible and accurate.  a qualified lawyer checked the 
indictment and trial were checked to ensure the charge of grievous bodily harm 
(GBH) brought against the defendant was appropriate to the injuries in the 
scenario, and that sufficient evidence existed for a trial to reasonably occur. 
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The prosecution case contained circumstantial evidence against the defendant 
and an ambiguous timeline of events which provided the defendant with the 
opportunity to commit the offence.  Combined, this evidence produced a 
tendency to guilty verdicts in the alibi witness absent control condition, which 
allowed the relative effect of alibi witness testimony in the experimental 
conditions to be assessed.  As in previous mock jury research (Golding, et al., 
2000) the evidence was presented in the form of a detailed 4 page summary of 
the case evidence. 
Further webpages required participants to indicate their verdict (guilty, not 
guilty) as well their confidence in this decision (rated from 0 [not at all confident] 
to 100 [completely confident]).  Other questions asked participants to rate the 
reliability of the defendant and alibi witness (with scores ranging from 0 [not at  
all reliable] to 100 [completely reliable]). The final webpage thanked and 
debriefed participants as well as provided relevant sources of support and 
contact details for the research team. 
Procedure
The URL for each of the study conditions was placed on an online university 
research participation database, as well as on social media.  Each URL was 
sequentially available until the necessary number of participants was recruited 
to each condition.  Upon clicking the URL, participants were taken to a secure 
site containing the study information and materials.  They then worked through 
each page sequentially, reading information and providing responses where 
appropriate.  
Ethics
The study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Code of 
Human Research Ethics (British Psychological Society, 2006).  This specific 
study was assessed and approved by the ethics committees at Sheffield Hallam 
University and Teesside University.  
Results
Verdict 
The majority of participants in each condition found the defendant guilty (see 
Table 1) with the raw data suggesting that, compared to having no alibi witness, 
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a motivated alibi witness increases the frequency of guilty verdicts, whereas an 
unmotivated alibi witness has no impact on perceptions of guilt.  A 2 x 2 x 2 
hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted to assess the influence of alibi 
witness (motivated, unmotivated) and alibi timing (timely, ambush) upon 
participant verdict (guilty, not guilty).  The main effect of verdict was significant; 
Χ2(1) = 25.78, p < .001; signifying that significantly more participants voted 
guilty (n = 102) than voted not guilty (n = 42).  All other main effects and 
interactions were not significant (all p > .05) indicating that the motivation and 
timing of the alibi witness’s evidence had no impact upon participants’ verdicts. 
Chi2 analyses comparing each of the experimental alibi conditions with the no 
alibi condition were all non-significant (all p > .05) meaning there was no 
significant association between condition and verdict. 
Confidence in verdict
Across the whole sample, participants voting guilty (M = 73.27, SD = 14.59) 
were on average more confident in their verdict choice, than those reaching a 
not guilty verdict (M = 60.10, SD = 20.79; t(178) = 4.758, p < .001).  Average 
verdict confidence scores ranged from 62.47 (SD = 19.53) in the unmotivated 
timely alibi condition to 73.94 (SD = 12.82) in the motivated timely alibi 
condition.  Table 1 illustrates that participants hearing no alibi, and those 
hearing an alibi (either timely or ambush) from the defendant’s girlfriend were 
more confident in their verdict, than participants hearing an alibi (either timely or 
ambush) from the defendant’s neighbour.  A one way ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the effect of condition (unmotivated timely alibi, motivated timely alibi, 
unmotivated ambush alibi, motivated ambush alibi, no alibi) upon verdict 
confidence.  Conducting a one way ANOVA rather than a factorial ANOVA 
allowed for the no alibi condition to be included in this analysis as this condition 
straddled both the alibi timing and alibi witness variables.  Although the overall 
ANOVA was significant; F(4, 175) = 2.54, p = .042, partial ƞ2 = .55; post hoc 
Bonferroni tests between each condition did not support this difference (all p > .
05).
Insert Table 1 about here
Reliability of case evidence
Participants’ ratings of defendant reliability were generally low (less than 50% of 
the available scale; see Table 2), with defendants rated least reliable when an 
unmotivated witness supported their ambush alibis (M = 35.67, SD = 21.04) and 
Running head: ALIBI TIMING AND ALIBI WITNESS MOTIVATION
most reliable when they had no supporting alibi witness (M = 41.25, SD = 
22.37).  A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of alibi timing or alibi 
witness motivation on ratings of defendant reliability (F(1, 140) = .071, p = .790, 
partial ƞ2 = .001 and F(1, 140) = .007, p = .931, ƞ2 = .000 respectively), and 
there was no significant interaction between these variables, F(1, 140) = .331, p 
= .566, partial ƞ2 = .002. 
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 illustrates that both the motivated and unmotivated alibi witnesses were 
rated as rather unreliable (M = 40.39, SD = 24.98) although variation was found 
between conditions such that the unmotivated timely alibi witness was 
perceived as the most reliable, and the motivated ambush alibi witness the least 
reliable type of alibi witness (M = 56.75, SD = 23.17 and M = 33.33, SD = 25.27 
respectively).  A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of alibi timing 
(timely, ambush) and alibi witness motivation (motivated, unmotivated) upon 
perceptions of alibi witness reliability.  This revealed significant main effects of 
alibi witness motivation; F(1, 140) = 12.92, p < .001, partial ƞ2= .084, and alibi 
timing, F(1, 140) = 5.96, p = .016, partial ƞ2 = .041; as well as a significant 
interaction between these variables; F(1, 140) = 5.75, p = .018, partial ƞ2 = .039. 
Thus, a timely unmotivated alibi witness (M = 56.75, SD = 23.17) was perceived 
as significantly more reliable than an ambush unmotivated alibi witness (M = 
37.97, SD = 19.68).  Similarly, a timely alibi from an unmotivated alibi witness 
was rated significantly more reliable than a timely alibi from a motivated alibi 
witness (M = 33.50, SD = 24.60).  However, there was no significant difference 
between the timely and ambush alibis provided by motivated alibi witnesses.  
Discussion
The study revealed that both alibi witness motivation and alibi timing had an 
effect upon mock juror perceptions of alibi witness reliability.  Furthermore, alibi 
witness evidence was rated as being rather unreliable (M = 40.39, SD = 24.98), 
thus offering support for the alibi scepticism hypothesis (Olson & Wells, 2004). 
However, defendants corroborated by an ‘unreliable’ alibi witness were not 
viewed as less reliable than those supported by a more reliable witness. 
Although prior research shows the police may believe that inaccurate alibis 
arise from deliberate deception (Dysart & Strange, 2012), the current study did 
not find support for this same belief amongst jurors as alibi witness motivation 
and alibi timing did not have a significant impact on case verdicts.  However, 
due to the investigator bias (Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Antón, 2005; Meissner & 
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Kassin, 2002), the police officers sampled by Dysart and Strange might have 
been inherently more suspicious of deception than the potential jurors in the 
general population sampled in the current study.  Instead, the current findings 
support Olson and Charman’s (2011) assertion that jurors may interpret 
inaccurate alibis as a sign of poor memory rather than deception.  Qualitative 
analysis of mock jury deliberations in cases with weak and/or changing alibis 
would help to establish the accuracy of this assertion.  
Alibi witness motivation
In accordance with previous research regarding the effect of alibi witness upon 
alibi believability (Allison & Brimacombe, 2010), the present findings suggest 
that although an unmotivated alibi witness has no impact upon a defendant’s 
case, a motivated alibi witness may actually harm their defence.  Hosch et al. 
(2011) found that motivated alibi witnesses related by marriage to a defendant 
(such as a sister-in-law) were perceived as less reliable than those with a social 
relationship and more relievable than those with a biological relationship to the 
defendant (Hosch, et al., 2011).  In the current study, the girlfriend of the 
defendant (motivated alibi witness) was viewed as a less reliable alibi witness 
than the neighbour of the defendant (unmotivated alibi witness).  Therefore, a 
girlfriend alibi witness is viewed as more similar to a marriage or biological 
related witness, than a socially related alibi witness.  Thus, the data reflect the 
suggestion that jurors perceive alibi witness evidence as an altruistic act 
influenced by the degree of relatedness between a defendant and their alibi 
witness (Hosch et al., 2011).  These findings are in contrast to those of Marion 
and Burke (2013) who observed that individuals lied to protect suspects who 
appear innocent regardless of whether they like them.  The relatively minor 
crime (minor theft) and ability to lie through omission, rather than actively 
construct a false story (Fawcett, 2012) could, however, account for Marion and 
Burke’s differing findings. 
Ambush alibis 
As the unreliability of the ambush witness did not affect ratings of defendant 
reliability or verdicts, there is no evidence that participants saw ambush alibis as 
indicative of the alibi witness and defendant working together to deceive the 
court.  This finding is surprising given the widely held (but erroneous) belief that 
inconsistency is a sign of deception (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004; Sporer, Penrod, 
Read, & Cutler, 1995), and that changes to testimony erode perceptions of 
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witness confidence in court (Brewer & Burke, 2002), a factor previously 
demonstrated to be associated with guilty verdicts (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 
1990).  However, Berman and Cutler (1996) found that jurors rated novel 
evidence in court (evidence not previously included in the investigation) as more 
reliable than contradictory evidence in court, and contradictions between pre-
trial and in court evidence.  The current study featured new evidence from a 
new witness, rather than new/inconsistent evidence from an existing witness as 
in Berman and Cutler’s (1996) and Brewer and Burke’s (2002) research.  As the 
decreased reliability of the ambush alibi witness (as indicated by participants) 
was not sufficient to influence verdicts in the current study, it appears that a 
contradictory alibi witness is perceived as less reliable than an alibi witness 
whose testimony ambushes the court.  This is an important finding because 
truthful defendants often change their alibi stories (Olson & Charman, 2011).   
The salience of witnessing a crime may make eyewitnesses less likely to 
change their evidence than honest alibi witnesses who are unaware that their 
actions at a particular time may later be of importance.  Due to alibi witnesses’ 
more plausible susceptibility to the calendar effect (Brewer, 1988), changes to 
an alibi should be viewed with less scepticism than changes to eyewitness 
testimony (Olson & Charman, 2011).  Although direct comparisons of 
eyewitnesses and alibi witnesses were not possible, that all alibi witnesses were 
not seen as entirely unreliable suggests that jurors may have some awareness 
of the calendar effect.  However, this did not stop participants from being more 
sceptical of changing ambush alibis witness evidence than of consistent timely 
alibi witness evidence.  This suggests that an overestimation of the ease with 
which an alibi can be supported (Strange et al., 2014; Turtle & Burke, 2001) is 
the cause of this enhanced scepticism to changes to alibi evidence (Culhane, 
2005).  Furthermore, these findings imply that to promote fair evaluation of alibis 
in court, judicial instruction on the difficulty of corroborating alibi stories and 
providing jurors with experience of this task are required (Turtle & Burke, 2001). 
Moreover, scepticism towards motivated alibi witnesses seems to negate the 
effect of alibi timing in that motivated alibi witnesses were viewed as so 
unreliable that ambush evidence was unable to further reduce juror reliability 
ratings without that evidence being discounted altogether.  
Verdicts 
Although the current findings support the concept of a negative bias regarding 
alibi witnesses, there was no effect of alibi timing or witness motivation upon 
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perceptions of defendant reliability or guilt.  In contrast to previous research 
(Culhane, 2005; Lindsay, Lim, Murando, & Cully, 1986) the presence of an alibi 
witness had no effect on evaluations of the defendant or on case verdicts 
compared to having no alibi corroborator.  Thus, weak alibis do not affect jurors’ 
decision-making (Dahl et al., 2009).  Shpurik and Meissner (2004) and Pozzulo, 
Pettalia, Dempsey, and Gooden (2014) suggest that jurors only consider alibi 
testimony when lacking other evidence against the defendant, an assertion 
reinforced by the low reliability ratings of the alibi evidence in general in the 
present study.  This contradicts the results of similar studies which found higher 
guilt ratings when a motivated alibi witness testified (Hosch et al., 2011). 
Utilising a continuous measure of guilt, Hosch et al. found that a corroborating 
alibi witness reduced belief in defendant guilt by 22%, but whether this 
reduction translates into a not guilty verdict is dependent upon participant 
formulations of the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard (Dhami, 2008) which have been 
shown to vary widely (Horowitz, 1997).  Horowitz demonstrated that reasonable 
doubt varies from 60% to 90% certainty in guilt, meaning that a 22% reduction 
may not be sufficient to convince participants of the defendant’s innocence. 
The dichotomous verdict (guilty, not guilty) utilised in this study reflected the 
real-world verdicts available to jurors but prevents examination of any more 
subtle effects of the study variables upon levels of perceived guilt.  As Olson 
and Wells (2004) highlight, guilt estimates are not always sensitive enough to 
measure perceptions of alibis, although further research with a more sensitive 
measure of guilt help elucidate this new research area.  Certainly, a belief that 
the alibi witness was unreliable (and potentially that they were deceptive) did 
not have a significant effect on evaluations of the defendant, suggesting that 
any deception by the alibi witness is not seen as stemming from the defendant. 
This is an interesting finding requiring further investigation through a qualitative 
examination of mock juror deliberations over an alibi witness charged with 
perjury.  
Limitations 
The online data collection used here may be seen as a limitation due to the 
potential for different response patterns online and offline, and the lack of jury 
deliberation, and summarised materials.  However, while trial summaries have 
limited ecological validity, they are appropriate in mock juror research 
(Diamond, 1997).  Moreover, prior juror decision-making research has used 
online methodology (Evans & Schreiber, 2010).  More specifically, no significant 
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effect of presentation modality (online or offline) has been found in other alibi 
research (Fawcett, 2012).  In general, the findings of psychological research 
conducted using web technology do not differ substantially from those collected 
using traditional pen and paper methodology (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & 
John, 2004).  Furthermore, deliberations have not been used in the research 
examining mock juror evaluations of alibi evidence (for example Burke & Turtle, 
2004; Culhane & Hosch, 2004; Olson & Wells, 2004; Sommers & Douglass, 
2007).  This is due to extensive interviews with real jurors revealing that 
deliberations play a modest role in determining verdicts (Bornstein, 1999; 
Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Meyers, Brashers, & Hanner, 2000).  
Summary and conclusions
In summary, this study assessed whether alibi scepticism bias observed in 
American mock juror studies (Culhane, et al., 2008; Olson & Wells, 2004) is 
prevalent in the UK population.  As alibi evidence was not rated as very reliable 
the alibi scepticism hypothesis (Olson & Wells, 2004) and Turtle & Burke’s 
(2001) assertion that people overestimate the ease of evidencing a genuine 
alibi were supported.  
More specifically the current study examined the specific impact of alibi timing 
(timely, ambush) and alibi witness motivation (motivated, unmotivated) upon 
juror decision-making.  In support of prior research (Burke & Turtle, 2004; 
Culhane, et al., 2008; Olson & Wells, 2004) motivated alibi witnesses were 
perceived as significantly less reliable than unmotivated alibi witnesses.  As 
changes to testimony have been associated with deception and decreased 
credibility (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Mann et al., 2004) it was anticipated, and 
indeed found, that timely alibi witness evidence would be viewed as more 
reliable than ambush alibi witness evidence.  That defendant reliability and guilt 
were not affected by type and timing of alibi witness corroboration, suggests 
that a weak alibi alone is not sufficient to convince a jury of a defendant’s guilt. 
Instead, jurors may see a weak or inconsistent alibi as reflecting genuine 
memory failure or mistakes (Olson & Charman, 2011) rather than deliberate 
deception.  However, further research is required to explore the accuracy of this 
suggestion.  In summary, the findings imply that by allowing ambush alibi 
evidence to be heard in the UK courts, judges do not appear to be providing 
defendants with an unfair advantage.  
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Table 1. Verdict and verdict confidence according to condition and decision reached
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Conditi
ona Verdict Frequency (%) Verdict Confidence According to Condition and Decision Reached
Guilty Not Guilty Guilty Not Guilty
M SD M SD M SD
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Note. an = 36
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Note. 0 = Not at all reliable, 100 = Completely reliable
